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In adolescence, aspects of cognition that are required to deal with complex cooperation
situations, such as mentalising and social value orientation, are still in development. In
the Trust Game, cooperation may lead to better outcomes for both players, but can also
lead to exploitation by the trustee. In the present study, we explore how mindreading, a
crucial aspect of mentalising, and social value orientation (whether someone is prosocial
or proself) are related to trust. In a group of 217 students (51% girls, Mage = 15.1) social
value orientation, mindreading and trust (using the Trust Game) were measured. The
result show that social value orientation moderates the relation between mindreading
and trust. In the group of prosocials, we find no correlation between mindreading and
trust. In the group of proselfs, mindreading is negatively correlated to trust, indicating that
proselfs use their mentalising skills to assess that the trustee is likely to exploit them.
Keywords: adolescence, trust, mindreading, social value orientation, social development
Introduction
People differ considerably in their motives underlying decision making in situations in which self-
interest is at odds with collective interest (i.e., social dilemmas). Some people focus on getting the
best out of the situation for themselves, while others try to make sure that all people involved
get a fair share (Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002). These motives reflect
proself vs. prosocial value orientations, respectively. These different social value orientations can
also be identified during adolescence. However, in adolescence, performance in social dilemmas
also depends on ongoingmaturation of the social cognitive skills underlying social decision-making
(Blakemore and Choudhury, 2006; Van den Bos et al., 2010, 2011a; Fett et al., 2014). The present
study investigates how social cognitive skills in adolescence interact with social value orientation
(SVO) during decision-making in social dilemmas.
An example of a social dilemma is the Trust Game, originally developed by Berg et al. (1995).
In this game, cooperation can lead to an increase in outcome for the self, at the risk of losing
the investment. The first player (the trustor) can choose to give a certain amount of money
to the second player (the trustee). This amount is tripled, and then the trustee can choose to
give a certain amount back to the trustor. Because the amount sent to the trustee is tripled,
the trustor can earn more money if the trustee reciprocates, but there is a risk that the trustee
will defect. The amount sent by the trustor is used as a measure of trust, and amount returned
by the trustee as a measure of trustworthiness. Every trusting interaction involves a risk that
the expected reciprocation (trustworthiness) will not take place or will be less than expected.
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Trust and trustworthiness are basic elements underlying
successful cooperative interactions.
In the last decade several studies using the Trust Game have
been performed to investigate the development of trust and
trustworthiness throughout adolescence. These studies report
an increase with age in both trust and trustworthiness from
childhood to adolescence (Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Van den
Bos et al., 2010, 2011a). The findings on the development of
trust and trustworthiness from adolescence to adulthood are less
consistent. Most studies find an increase in trust (Sutter and
Kocher, 2007; Van den Bos et al., 2011a; Fett et al., 2012), but
a decrease has also been reported (Van den Bos et al., 2010).
For trustworthiness, most studies report no differences between
adolescents and adults (Sutter and Kocher, 2007; Van den Bos
et al., 2010, 2011b), but one study finds more trustworthiness in
adults (Belli et al., 2012).
In the Trust Game, the trustor’s decision on howmuch money
to send to the trustee depends, among other factors, on the
trustor’s SVO (Kanagaretnam et al., 2009). SVO is oftenmeasured
using a simple task in which points are distributed between the
self and another (Van Lange et al., 1997b). Generally, two types of
SVO’s are identified: the prosocial and the proself type. Proselfs
strive to maximize their own outcome, whereas prosocials strive
to maximize joint outcomes and equality of outcomes (Van
Lange, 1999). Sometimes the proself type is subdivided in the
individualist and competitive type (Van Lange et al., 1997b).
Individualists strive to maximize only their own outcome, with
no consideration for the outcomes of others. Competitors strive
to maximize their own outcome relative to others’ outcomes
(Bogaert et al., 2008). Since prosocials are inclined to cooperate
it can be presumed they are more trusting and trustworthy than
proselfs. Some studies have indeed found that prosocials have
higher levels of trust and trustworthiness than proselfs (Snijders,
1996; Kanagaretnam et al., 2009).
However, in the Trust Game, as opposed to many other
social dilemmas, cooperation may lead to a better pay-off for
the trustor than defection. If the trustor presumes that the
trustee will return a fair amount of money, the trustor is better
off trusting than not trusting. So even proself players, aiming
to maximize their own outcome, could decide to cooperate,
dependent on their evaluation of the trustee’s decision. One way
to predict the trustees’ decision is by imagining what decision
you would make in their place. However, in order to do so,
the trustor needs advanced mentalising skills to understand the
other’s mental processes. Recent studies have shown that more
advanced applications of mentalising are still developing until
late adolescence (Moriguchi et al., 2007; Dumontheil et al., 2010).
The current study focused on the ability to read the mental
states of others in their eyes, often referred to as mindreading
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997), as a measure of mentalising or
theory of mind. The neural mechanisms of mindreading are still
developing throughout adolescence (Gunther Moor et al., 2012;
Overgaauw et al., 2014).
The effect of trying to understand the trustee’s intentions may
be different for prosocial and proselfs. Mindreading may help
prosocials to realize that the Trust Game offers a possibility
to increase outcomes for both players. Prosocials with good
mindreading skills may therefore be more inclined to trust. For
proselfs on the other hand, reading the mind of the trustee
may reveal that the trustee has the chance to exploit the trust
of the trustor. Therefore, proselfs with good mindreading skills
may be less inclined to trust. Thus, it can be hypothesized that
the relation between mindreading skills and trust is positive in
prosocials and negative in proselfs. The aim of the present study
was to test this hypothesis. A group of adolescents performed
a Trust Game, an SVO task and a mindreading task. The
hypothesis was that the relation between mindreading and trust
is moderated by SVO.
Methods
Participants
In this study, 217 secondary students (M age = 15.11 years,
SD = 0.44, age range = 14.1–16.4) participated of which 111
(51%) were females. All subjects were in the third year of the
Dutch secondary education, which can be compared with the
10th grade in the United States. Participants were from five
different schools, located in various towns and cities in the
Netherlands. Five participants (2%) were excluded from the
original sample, because they did not follow the instructions
of the test administers. Fifteen participants (7%) were excluded
because they failed to complete all measures. The Dutch
educational system is subdivided in several levels: secondary
vocational education (VMBO), general secondary education
(HAVO), and pre-university secondary education (VWO). In the
final sample of 197 participants, 92 were enrolled in the VMBO
level (47%), 67 in the HAVO level (34%), and 38 in the VWO level
(19%). The Trust Game results of the same sample of students
are also reported in another paper focussing on the interaction
between gender and SVO (Derks et al., 2014).
Materials
Social Value Orientation
To measure SVO, the Triple-Dominance Measure was used (Van
Lange et al., 1997b). This is a paper-and-pencil task that has
been tested for real-life validity in several experiments relating
a prosocial value orientation to real-life prosocial outcomes (Van
Lange et al., 1997a, 2007; De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Nauta
et al., 2002). The task consists of nine choices that the participants
have to make and which influence the outcomes of both the
participant and an unknown, hypothetical other. The participant
can always choose between three different distributions of points:
a cooperative outcome (in which the participant and the other get
the same amount of points), an individualistic outcome (in which
the participant getsmore points than the other) and a competitive
outcome (in which the participant gets less points than in the
individualistic, but gets more points relative to the other).
When participants made six or more congruent choices they
were classified as cooperators, individualists or competitors. As is
often done (e.g., De Cremer and Van Lange, 2001; Joireman et al.,
2001; Stouten et al., 2005), the individualists and competitors
were classified into one group called proselfs (61 participants,
39%), whereas the cooperators are known as prosocials (94
participants, 61%). Forty-two participants (21%) did not make
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consistent choices and could not be classified. Their scores were
not used in the analyses.
Mindreading
To measure mindreading skills, the child’s version of the Reading
the Mind in the Eyes Task (RME) was used (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997, 2001a,b). In this task, the participants are shown a series
of pairs of eyes. For each pair of eyes, the participants have to
choose the correction option from four listed states of mind.
Participants get one point for each correct choice. The task
was shortened down from 28 to 15 pairs of eyes due to time
restrictions. The response options were translated from English
to Dutch. Although different version of the RME have been tested
for validity and psychometric properties (Hallerbäck et al., 2009;
Fernández-Abascal et al., 2013; Vellante et al., 2013), our Dutch
version has not yet been validated.
The RME was originally designed as a measure of Theory
of Mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Several different authors
have given different names to the outcomes of the measure
such as emotion recognition (Guastella et al., 2010) and social
sensitivity (Woolley et al., 2010). In line with a large number of
studies (Roeyers et al., 2001; Domes et al., 2007; Hysek et al.,
2012; Schilling et al., 2012), we consider the task a measure of
mindreading.
Trust Game
The computerized version of the Trust Game that was used in
the present study was based on the original task developed by
Berg et al. (1995). In the game, participants were told that they
were connected to a peer from another school. However, in reality
the responses of the second player were based on a computer
algorithm. Each participant played a total of 10 rounds, five times
in the role of trustor and five times in the role of trustee. The
players were told that they were connected to a different player
for each round so that the games were one-shot rounds. This
is important because one-shot games tend to invoke different
strategies than games with repeated rounds with the same player
(King-Casas et al., 2005). The participants were instructed that
they (and the other players) could not keep the money made
in the game but that they should play as if they would. The
decision to use non-real players was made because the testing
conditions at the schools made the use of real-time interactions
with students from other schools virtually impossible. It was
made clear to the participants that the game would be played
completely open, thus that all decisions made by the players
would be visible to the other player.
Before each round as a trustor, the participants first saw a
screen saying that the computer was connecting through the
internet with a computer at another school. The subjects also saw
the first letter of the name of the other player to make sure they
understood each round was played with another player. Then, the
participants saw on the screen that they were given e6 and had
the choice to send e0, e2, e4, or e6 euro to the other player.
If they chose not to give any money the round was finished and
the final scores were presented (participante6, othere0). If they
chose to give an amount, this amount was tripled and given to the
trustee. The participants were then told that the other player was
making a decision about returning money. After a few seconds,
the decision of the second player and the outcome of the game
were revealed (e.g., participant e6, other e12). Hereafter, the
next round as a trustor started. The return of the trustee was pre-
programmed as a percentage of the received amount and different
for each round, but the same for all participants (round 1= 50%,
round 2 = 33 1/3%, round 3 = 0%, round 4 = 50%, round 5 =
33 1/3%).
After the five trustor rounds, the five trustee rounds started.
Each round started with the message that the trustors were
making a decision. After a number of seconds, the amount sent
by the trustor was revealed. The amount given by the trustor
was pre-programmed and different per round but the same for
each participant (round 1 = e4, round 2 = e6, round 3 = e2,
round 4= e6, round 5= e4; as is custom in the Trust Game the
participant received these amounts in threefold). The participant
could send an amount back to the trustor by typing in an integer
between e0 and the amount received. The final pay-offs were
then revealed on screen (e.g., other player e9, participant e9)
and the next round started.
In the statistical analysis, the percentage of the total amount
sent by the participant when playing as a trustor was used
as a measure for trust. The measure for trustworthiness was
the percentage of the amount received by the trustor that was
returned when the participant played the role of the trustee.
In the instructions and the experiment, words like “trust,”
“trustworthiness,” “trustor,” and “trustee” were not used.
Procedure
The schools that were selected for participation sent a letter to
all the parents of eligible participants. In this letter, the study
was briefly described and the parents were told that they could
object to their child participating in the study. The adolescents
themselves also had the opportunity to refuse participation. None
of the parents or adolescents objected. In line with our standard
procedure for testing at schools, the subjects were not paid
for participation and could not earn real money in any of the
tasks. The ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and
Education approved the study.
Testing took place in a quiet room in the schools. Participants
were tested in groups of six at a time. First the procedure
of the Trust Game was explained to the participants verbally
by the study administers. Then, two of the participants were
asked to play out a round of the game in front of the other
subjects under guidance of the test supervisors to further clarify
the rules of the game. Thereafter, some questions regarding
the set-up of the Trust Game were asked individually to the
participants on a laptop. If the subjects made any mistakes, the
test administers gave them extra instructions verbally. Then,
the participants performed the Trust Game individually on the
laptops. Thereafter, the participants completed the mindreading
task, the SVO task and some further questions about personal
details (sex, age, etc.) on paper.
Statistical Analysis
First, the relations between trust, trustworthiness, mindreading,
SVO, sex, and age were established using Pearson’s correlations.
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In addition, t-tests were performed to test differences in levels
of trust and trustworthiness between prosocials and proselfs and
between boys and girls.
To test if SVO is a valid moderator of the relation between
mindreading and trust a regression analysis was performed. In
the analysis, SVO (0 = prosocial, 1 = proself), mindreading
(centered) and their interaction term (SVO x mindreading) were
the independent variables and trust was the dependent variable.
Age (centered) and sex (0 = boy, 1 = girl) were used as control
variables. Simple slope analyses were used to further explore the
interaction effect.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for trust, trustworthiness, mindreading,
SVO, sex, and age and their (cor)relations are depicted inTable 1.
Trust was positively correlated with trustworthiness [r(153) =
0.33, p < 0.001] and this correlation remained significant
when controlling for age and sex [r(153) = 0.32, p < 0.001].
Mindreading was not significantly correlated with trust [r(153) =
−0.09, p = 0.29] or trustworthiness [r(153) = 0.12, p = 0.14] and
these correlations remained non-significant when controlling for
age and sex [trust: r(153) = −0.07, p = 39, trustworthiness:
r(153) = 0.11, p = 0.20]. Prosocials were significantly more
trusting [t(153) = 3.47, p = 0.001] and more trustworthy
[t(153) = 4.47, p < 0.001] than proselfs. Furthermore, boys were
more trusting than girls [t(153) = 2.43, p = 0.02], but there were
no significant sex differences in trustworthiness [t(153) = −0.67,
p = 0.51]. Moreover, age was a negatively correlated to trust
[r(153) = −0.19, p = 0.02] and trustworthiness [r(153) = −0.21,
p = 0.008]. Please note that these results have already been
published and discussed in Derks et al. (2014).
Moderator Analyses
Regression analyses were performed to test the moderating effect
of SVO on the relation between mindreading and trust. In
the first step, SVO, mindreading and the two control variables,
age and sex, were added as predictors. In the second step, the
interaction between SVO and (centered) mindreading was added
as a dummy variable. The results of the regression analyses
are depicted in Table 2. The R2-change between model 1 and
model 2 was significant (R2
change
= 0.026, p = 0.029). The
interaction term in model 2 was significant [β = −0.88,
t(149) = −2.21, p = 0.029] indicating that SVO was a
significant moderator of the relation between mindreading and
trust. To further investigate the nature of this moderation, simple
slope analyses were performed separately for the prosocials and
proselfs. These analyses revealed that in the group of prosocials
there was no significant relation between mindreading and trust
[Bmindreading = 0.09, t(93) = 0.36, p = 0.72]. However, for
the proselfs the effect of mindreading on trust was significant
[Bmindreading = −0.79, t(60) = −2.55, p = 0.01], indicating better
mindreading skills were associated with lower trust. The slopes of
this interaction are plotted in Figure 1.
Discussion
In the present study a group of adolescents performed a Trust
Game, a mindreading task, and an SVO measure. Adolescents
with prosocial preferences were more likely to trust than
adolescents with proself preferences. The results further reveal
that SVO moderates the relation between mindreading and trust
in adolescence. Within the group of proselfs, mindreading skills
were negatively related to trust indicating that those with good
mindreading skills were less likely to trust than those with worse
mindreading skills. It seems that having an understanding of
the mind of the others makes proselfs less likely to risk their
money in the Trust Game. Within the group of prosocials, a
positive correlation was expected. However, for these adolescents
mindreading was unrelated to trust.
A possible explanation for the finding that the moderation
is driven by the negative association between mindreading and
trust within the proselfs may be that prosocials and proselfs frame
social dilemma decisions differently. Prosocials tend to frame
decisions in terms of morality (moral or immoral decisions),
whereas proselfs frame them in terms of power (weak or strong
decisions) (Liebrand et al., 1986; Bogaert et al., 2008; Balliet
et al., 2009). For prosocials, reading the mind of the other
may not influence the decisions since they view cooperation
as a moral obligation, regardless of the decision of the other
player. For proselfs, the trust decision is influenced by their
their ability to mentalise because they may view the decision
to trust as weak when they realize that they can easily be
exploited. In addition, prosocials and proselfs may differ in
their assumptions of others’ preferences. The triangle hypothesis
(Kelley and Stahelski, 1970; Van Lange, 1992; Iedema and
Poppe, 1995; Weingart et al., 2007) states that prosocials hold
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics and Pearson correlations.
M SD 1 2 3 4 5
Trust 48.4% 17.9% −
Trustworthiness 31.1% 13.5% 0.330** −
Mindreading 9.10 2.05 −0.086 0.119 −
SVO score (0 = prosocial, 1 = proself) 0.39 0.49 −0.270** −0.340** −0.125 −
Sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 0.52 0.50 −0.139* 0.054 0.150 −0.155 −
Age 15.12 0.45 −0.185* −0.214** −0.061 0.131 −0.102
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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TABLE 2 | Summary of regression analysis for variables predicting trust without interaction term (Model 1) and with interaction term (Model 2).
Variable Model 1 Model 2
B SE B β B SE B β
Social value orientation −3.251 0.836 −0.297*** −3.363 0.827 −0.307***
Mindreading −0.257 0.199 −0.098 −0.089 0.251 0.034
Age −2.124 0.906 −0.177* −1.992 0.896 −0.166*
Sex −2.593 0.817 −0.242** −2.596 0.807 −0.242**
SVO × Mindreading −0.883 0.399 −0.210*
R2 0.168 0.194
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
FIGURE 1 | Plots of slopes for the interaction between mindreading and
social value orientation (prosocial or proself) on trust, using sex and
age as control variables. In the Plot, low mindreading is set at −1 standard
deviation from the mean and high mindreading at +1 standard deviation.
a heterogeneous view of the preferences of others, assuming
that others are either prosocial or proself. On the other hand,
proselfs are thought to hold a more homogeneous view of
other’s preferences, assuming that most others are proself like
themselves. In the Trust Game, proselfs with good mindreading
skills may decide not to trust, because they understand that
the other can exploit them by not trusting. On the other
hand, prosocials with good mindreading skills may realize
that the trustee can either repay or exploit the trust decision.
Since they have no presumption of the SVO of the trustee,
their trust decision may not be affected by their mindreading
skills.
Adolescent cooperative behavior is complex and adolescents
have to learn to deal with others who may or may not be
trustworthy or reliable. In order to predict the cooperation
decisions of others, adolescents need to be able to mentalise,
a skill that is still developing throughout adolescence
(Dumontheil et al., 2010). Recent studies have found that
mentalising skills are important in understanding adolescent
social decision making (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Van den Bos
et al., 2011b; Fett et al., 2014). The present study extends
these findings by showing that the effect of mentalising
skills is moderated by the prosocial orientation of the
adolescent.
A number of limitations of this study have to be mentioned.
First, earnings in the Trust Game were not actually paid out
to the participants. Payments being hypothetical influences the
outcomes of social dilemmas according to some (Hertwig and
Ortmann, 2001; Vlaev, 2012), but not all studies (Madden et al.,
2003; Locey et al., 2011). In a meta-analysis, Balliet et al. (2009)
find that hypothetical payments may influence the strength but
not the direction of the relation between social value orientation
and cooperation in social dilemmas. Second, in this study
mindreading was used to measure mentalising skills. It could be
argued that mindreading does not capture all the aspects needed
to be able to mentalise. However in this study, we have used
mindreading as a proxy for mentalising or theory of mind, based
on the original intentions of the authors (Baron-Cohen et al.,
1997).
In summary, the results of the present study show that
the effect of mindreading skills on trust in a Trust Game
is moderated by SVO in adolescence. In prosocials there
is no relation between mindreading and trust, whereas in
proselfs, higher mindreading was correlated with lower trust.
It thus seems that proselfs use their mindreading skills to
infer that the trustee might not repay their trust. More
research is needed to see if the same effects are found in
adult populations, which in general will have better developed
mentalising skills. In addition, the role of SVO and mentalising
can be studied in cooperation situations other than the Trust
Game.
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